In this paper we consider a model in which a customer chooses one of two retailers with a choice probability depending on the distance from the customer's position to the retailer's position over a line segment market. We study an optimal strategy for two retailers in a competitive inventory model by using an equilibrium point in the context of the game theory. We find an equilibrium point concerned with the optimal ordering quantity to minimize the total cost.
Introduction
In the studies concerned wit h inventory control problems there are many research works finding the optimal strategy for a single retailer. Studies on an equilibrium point for many retailers have been published in recent years. For instance Parlar [S] has proved the existance and uniqueness of the Nash solution for an inventory problem with two substitutable products having random demands. Lippman and McCardle [6] have examined the relation between equilibrium inventory levels and the splitting rule and provide conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium point for a competitive version of the classical newsboy problem. A model represented in this paper is considered as one of special cases of their problems.
We are interested in a problem finding the optimal strategy for many retailers such that they are related with something each other. In this paper we consider a model in which a customer chooses a retailer with a choice probability depending on the distance from the customer's position to the retailer's position over a line segment market and we discuss on the ordering policy including a state of customer's choice. The probability represented in Huff model [4] gives us more realistic model. However it is numerically complicated, so we use a very simple probability here. We study an optimal strategy for two retailers in a competitive inventory model by using an equilibrium point in the context of game theory. Our purpose is to find an equilibrium point concerned with the optimal ordering quantity to minimize the total cost, i.e. the sum of the ordering cost, the holding cost and the penalty cost.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model in our study. In Section 3 we concretely provide the equilibrium point in this model formulated as a two-person nonzero-sum game. It is obvious that the results obtained in this paper differs from those for a single retailer. Section 4 deals with a numerical example. And finally, this paper ends with some conclusions in Section 5.
. Model Description
We consider a single period model where customers go to buy a kind of product to two retailers with a probability. The problem discussed in this paper is formulated as a twoperson nonzero-sum game on the inventory control. Two retailers, called Player I and Player 11, begin to sell products a t the same time. All customers are shared by two players. Player I locates his position at point 0 in the interval [O, l] and Player I1 does at point 1. It is possible for the players to place an order only once a t the beginning of the period. They receive products to sell without lead-time. If the products are in short supply, they are not backlogging after that. They purchase the products a t an ordering cost per unit and sell them at a selling price per unit. If players have some stock to sell, then they are charged holding costs. On the other hand, if they do not have any stock and have occurred demand, then they are charged penalty costs.
he customers uniformly distribute in the interval [O, l] . The customer who stays at
, l] first visits Player I1 with the probability U to go to buy one of products ayer I with the remaining probability 1 -U . If a player he has first visited does not have inventory to sell on his hand, he must visit another player. The customers start from their positions at the same time as their sales and transfer with the same speed. Then the arrival time taken from each of their positions to the firms is in proportion to the transference distance. Let t denote the unit transference time. We assume that their planning period is 2t if players are very kind a d wait for them until that time the last possible customers may come to purchase it. For instance, if a customer stays a t point 0 first visits Player I1 and he has nothing to sell, he will travel to Player I in order to satisfy consider the planning period I t as a single period and we deal with a single period inventory problem in this paper. The customers do not know inventory quantities which players have on hand at any time.
We assume that they know mutual unit ordering, holding and penalty costs and they are non-cooperative. The aim of each player is to minimize the personal total cost, i.e. the sum of the ordering cost, the holding cost and the penalty cost. Which strategies should they take t o achieve their purposes? How much inventory quantities should they order at the beginning of the period? We study their strategies in a competitive inventory model using an equilibrium point in the context of game theory.
We make use of the following notations.
: the number of customers on a market : the ordering quantity for Player I, which is a decision 
On the other hand, the inventory quantity Q 2 ( T ) is represented by
The total cost C i ( x , y ) is given by Situation 3. We consider the situation on 0 < X < ^y > $ and X + y < b. In this situation it yields the shortages in inventory on Player I side and not all the customers who have been not satisfied on Player I side asre satisfied by stock on hand of Player I1 side. For Player I we obtain the similar results to those on Situation 2. On the other hand, the inventory quantity Q 2 ( T ) is given by Equation (2.6). Given real numbers X and y, let t2 denote the time T satisfying t + ti < T < 2t and
we can regard t2 as a function of X and y and let it write t 2 ( x , y ) . Using the equations + (h2 + m)-,rSituation 4. We consider the ~itua~tion on 0 5 X < 1-and 0 < y < k. In this situation only customers who have visited players earlier a8re sakisfied their demands. If they are not satisfied by a player they have first visited, they amre not satisfied after this. The inventory quantity Q l ( T ) is represented by
t < T < t + t 3 X -m -u ) b d u + Q^{ T -t ) , t + t 3 < T <'it
Q 2 ( T ) , the inventory quantity for Player I1 at time T , is given by Equation 
A Competitive Inventory Mode1
Also we calculate C a x , y) likewise and we have Situation 5. We consider the situation on X 2 k , 0 <: y < $ and X + y 2 b. This situation supplies the products for all customers as well as Situations 1 and 2. It yields the shortages in inventory on Player I1 side. However all the customers who have been not satisfied on Player I1 side are satisfied on Player I side. This case is the situation exchanged a role between Player I and I1 on Situation 2. Therefore the total costs C i ( x , y) and C j { x , y ) are given as follows:
Situation 6. At last we consider the situation on X 2 I-, 0 < y < I -and X + y < b. In this situation it yields the shortages in inventory on Player I1 side and not all the customers who have been not satisfied on Player I1 side are satisfied them on Player I side. This is the situation exchanged a role between Player I and I1 on Situation 3. Therefore the total costs CA(x, y) and C a x , y ) are given as follows:
Here t d x , y ) denotes the time T satisfying t + t3 <, T < 2t and X + y -y b + 3 + b = 0.
Equilibrium Point
In this section we formulate our model as a two-person non-zero-sum game and we find an equilibrium point in this model. Because a player becomes to have useless quantity in inventory if he orders products more than b, he never take such a behavior. Therefore we restrict his behavior to the interval [O, b] . Including all possibility in the range [O, b] 
we find an equilibrium point in the concepts of a mixed strategy with continuous strategies. we have
Therefore we see that Ml(x, G ) is a strictly convex function, so there uniquely exists the optimal strategy for Player I. Here we consider three cases.
Case on limX+b12-0 ?&!p > 0:
Now we find the optimal ordering quantity X* that is satisfied = 0. Setting the partial derivatives of Ml (X, G) as zero, we obtain the value h-l+Pl
As it must follow 0 < t* < t, we have a sufficient condition 0 < r l -cl < 7.
Substituting Equation (3.6) for X* = ^-b t -k b , we have the optimal ordering quantity aMl(x7G) > 0:
Case on limx+b12-o v 5 0 and lirnx+b,2+o ax It is easy t o see that the optimal strategy X* is equal to 1 for Player I. It must follow 0 <, y < b / 2 in this case. Using a uniqueness of the optimal strategy y* for Player I1 under the similar analysis on Mfi y), Equation (3.4) is rewritten as follows:
Ml ( X , G) is a n increasing linear function in x if y* is greater than or equal to is clear that he had better have less inventory quantity. Hence Player I chooses X* = b -y* for his optimal strategy. Otherwise, we find the minimizer X* on Equation (3.8) . Setting the partial derivatives of Mi (X, G) as zero, we ha,ve the value As it must follow t + tg 5 ti < 2t, we have sufficient conditions
rl -cl < hl and 0 < r 2 -c2 < v. 
tl=aÂ and equilibrium point is ( 2 ( c 1 -r 
If it follows the suficient conditions 9 + -1 < rl -cl < h1 and h 2 +~2
-.
2r2-2~2-h2+~2)~ 2 ( q -cl -hi)'
0 < 7-2 -c2 < 9, then the equilibrium point is (i + ( q -c l costs for Player I have a few influence on the price of Player I1 on ri -cl ==--2.9. On the other hand, Player I1 does not have an influence on Player I at all. Because they have the strategies with the other player under consideration, it is nothing that the sum of their strategies is over b.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we deal with a single period competitive inventory model with the choice probability proportional to distance on a line segment market. Cases (ii), (iv), (v) and (vii) are new results having obtained in this work. This inventory problem was formulated as one of games with pure strategies of continuous cardinary. Consequently the mixed strategy was consistent with the pure strategy. Since all of costs were linear, the total cost became a strictly convex function, so we uniquely had the solution. We are also able to use this method in the non-linear case. Hence we will be able to find equilibrium points by means of the mixed strategy for more complicated models. Also this model will be able to be extended to a multi-period model and it will be compared with models changed assumptions. They are further research problems and we hope this paper becomes a stepstone of research on competitive inventory problems.
